r/ActiveMeasures • u/PittMNLA • 5h ago
Russian asset
🍊💩🤡 has always been a Russian asset. He is a clear and present danger to the security of the United States. Republicans are complicit in this country’s downfall.
r/ActiveMeasures • u/Barch3 • May 16 '23
r/ActiveMeasures • u/infomuch-- • Apr 10 '24
Active measures? Well, that's what we in the West call it. But what Russia does these days is more the work of 'political technologists.' There has been a tremendous amount of confusion about what Russia is doing online - and what they have done. Some of it has been exaggerated, some underreported. I've sat on this account of Russia's interference in the 2016 US election for years, but, thanks to an intrepid production company, it's seeing the light of day. It's the story of the first people to detect Russia's interference in the election. Basically, it recounts a moment the world changed, through the eyes of those who could see it first. Anyway, people following the active measures space may be interested.
r/ActiveMeasures • u/PittMNLA • 5h ago
🍊💩🤡 has always been a Russian asset. He is a clear and present danger to the security of the United States. Republicans are complicit in this country’s downfall.
r/ActiveMeasures • u/dryheat122 • 4h ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 2h ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/OtherwiseCanary8971 • 4h ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 4h ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 6h ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/Vast-Speaker-4949 • 1d ago
So, we don't have American financing for this?
r/ActiveMeasures • u/Miao_Yin8964 • 4h ago
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has no plan to strengthen partnerships with academic institutions to counter threats from nontraditional intelligence collectors (NTCs), according to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published Oct. 16. Without stronger partnerships, GAO concluded, the FBI's ability to protect U.S. research, intellectual property, and technological advantage is hindered. Unlike intelligence officers, NTCs function independently of established intelligence organizations, and FBI officials said they are difficult to identify and investigate.
FBI officials said identifying and investigating NTCs is difficult because their conduct may not violate the law until they transfer information to a foreign entity. Cultural differences compound the problem: Academic institutions promote the free exchange of information, and FBI officials said universities may not want to be perceived as "turning over" their students. FBI officials and representatives from academic associations identified cultural differences and communication barriers as challenges in addressing threats posed by NTCs.
The FBI offices responsible for mitigating and investigating NTC threats include the Office of Private Sector, which leads information-sharing and engagement with the private sector, and the Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. The FBI also uses the National Counterintelligence Task Force and field office-based Counterintelligence Task Forces to coordinate with partner agencies on these matters.
FBI officials have publicly stated that relationships with academic institutions need strengthening to address research security issues. Academic association representatives said the FBI could improve outreach efforts, noting that FBI-university relationships are stronger at some universities than others. Despite those concerns, the FBI has not identified a plan to strengthen its partnerships with academic institutions.
GAO made one recommendation: The FBI director should develop and implement a plan to strengthen the bureau's partnerships with academic institutions to better facilitate information exchange and help address threats posed by NTCs. The FBI concurred with the recommendation, which remains open. GAO has not yet confirmed that the agency has taken sufficient action to address it.
FBI officials said they rely on tips from academia to identify potential nontraditional intelligence collectors, and GAO found that inadequate partnerships with academic institutions hinder the FBI's ability to counter those threats. Tracking whether the FBI moves from concurrence to developing and implementing a plan will be the clearest signal of whether the recommendation produces a change in counterintelligence practice.
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 11h ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 1d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 1d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 1d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 1d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/Strongbow85 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/Strongbow85 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/Strongbow85 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/Strongbow85 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/snad2012 • 2d ago
r/ActiveMeasures • u/sphuci • 3d ago