which comes as no surprise at all. We are for a reason the most progressive and innovative continent

European Union Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has said the bloc should consider establishing a standing military force of 100,000 troops and overhaul the political processes governing defense.

Faced with Russian aggression and the U.S. shifting its focus away from Europe and threatening Greenland, Kubilius argued for a “big bang” approach to re-imagining Europe’s common defense.

“Would the United States be militarily stronger if they would have 50 armies on the States level instead of a single federal army,” he said at a Swedish security conference on Sunday. “Fifty state defence policies and defense budgets on the states level, instead of a single federal defense policy and budget?”

“If our answer is 'no,’ [the] USA would not be stronger, then — what are we waiting for?”

Kubilius said Europe's defense readiness depends on three pillars: more investment in production capacity; institutions that are prepared and organized; and the political will to deter and, if needed, fight.

Merely increasing funding for Europe’s existing defense setup won’t meet these requirements, he said, in part because of a lack of unity.

"We need to start to invest our money in such a way, that we would be able to fight as Europe, not just as collection of 27 national ‘bonsai armies’,” he said, borrowing a phrase from former EU High Representative Josep Borrell.

Europe could instead create — "as Jean-Claude Juncker, Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel already proposed 10 years ago" a powerful, standing “European military force” of 100,000 troops, he said.

To help solve the issue of political will, Kubilius wants to establish a European Security Council. The idea has been talked up by French President Macron and former German Chancellor Merkel.

“The European Security Council could be composed of key permanent members, along with several rotational members, including the member state with the Council presidency,” said Kubilius. “Plus the leadership of the EU: Commission and Council presidents.”

The proposed security council should also include the United Kingdom, Kubilius said.

“In total around 10-12 members, with the task to discuss the most important issues in defense, some of which I just mentioned before,” Kubilius said. “And not only discussing, but also swiftly preparing important decisions.”

By Victor Bohman Lind, member of the executive committee of Volt Sweden

It is not enough to simply state that a European federation is needed in theory, writes a representative of the Volt party. When liberal representatives continue to narrow the scope of politics to Swedish domestic affairs, they are playing into the hands of nationalism.

In April, Eric Luth, editor-in-chief of Liberal Debatt, wrote that Europe had reached a point where a European federation must replace the nation states. Luth’s analysis was spot on, but it left the bigger question unanswered: why does mainstream liberalism lack the courage to put this analysis into practice?

Far to the right and left, parties rarely hesitate. Today’s political success stories belong to those movements that set out a clear, uncompromising direction and offer an ideological alternative to the status quo. Voters are rarely persuaded by reactivity and compromise; they seek visions for the future and clear narratives when existing solutions fail to deliver.

The problem is that liberal parties all too often meet nationalism on its own terms. When nationalist movements offer a narrative of national belonging and independence, they respond by defending the status quo: European cooperation is important and Sweden should take responsibility. This is certainly true, but it is no vision. The political centre cannot win by merely managing the status quo and defending current institutional norms whilst nationalism formulates visions for the future.

That is why federalism is needed.

Today’s EU resembles a reverse confederation, where Member States are transferring more and more issues to the European level, but without at the same time providing that level with the tools required to implement decisions effectively enough. Federalism would allow the principle of subsidiarity to function fully by making it just as natural for power to move between the national and European levels as it is between local authority, region and state.

Within the pan-European Volt party, we see from our steady growth that there is a clear demand for an uncompromising European direction. Many are turning to us out of disappointment at the established parties’ lack of vision. But fighting back against nationalism is not a single-party project; it requires a broad political coalition.

Let us therefore do this together. Take these principles back to your parties, put federalism on the agenda – and join us in building the counter-narrative to nationalism that our Europe needs!

The bloc’s defense chief reiterates his call for an EU army in an interview with POLITICO.

BRUSSELS — The EU's response to the crisis in transatlantic relations should be to build up its own military capabilities, Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius told POLITICO.

The bloc's defense chief was interviewed just before NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte's Wednesday meeting with Donald Trump. Despite Rutte's ongoing efforts to placate the U.S. president, the White House meeting ended with Trump railing at NATO allies for failing to help with the war he launched against Iran.

After the meeting, Trump went on Truth Social to slam the alliance: “NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM, AND THEY WON’T BE THERE IF WE NEED THEM AGAIN."

Trump's attacks on NATO, his threats to annex Greenland — reiterated on Wednesday — as well as the tariffs he's imposed on allies and the Iran war are all undermining European confidence in America.

The European Pulse survey, conducted by Cluster17 for POLITICO and beBartlet, polled 6,698 Europeans across Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Belgium from March 13 to March 21. It found that only 35 percent of those polled saw the U.S. as a close ally or a partner while 60 percent saw it as a competitor or a threat.

The U.S. "has an influence into how Europeans look at NATO," Kubilius told POLITICO in an interview airing at the European Pulse Forum, adding that the survey shows that "if trust in the transatlantic partnership is going down," that also affects perceptions of NATO.

The survey did find that 76 percent of people would favor sending their country's military to help a NATO ally under attack, but there is also strong backing for Europe to develop its own defense capabilities — backed by 86 percent of those polled — with 69 percent favoring the creation of a common European military force.

Kubilius flew to Washington for talks at the Pentagon on Friday about boosting the bloc's defensive capabilities.

Kubilius told POLITICO that the poll show that shows the "trust of Europeans in themselves, in their capability, in what we can call independent capability is becoming quite high," underlining his own position favoring the establishment of an EU army. However, other senior officials like Kaja Kallas, the EU's top diplomat, have rejected the idea.

People "want, first of all, Europe to be much stronger in defense, and second, they want to see some kind of ... real military force," the defense commissioner said, adding that Europeans "understand that just a combination of 27 [armies] cannot bring that value."

This "is a very strong message, and I hope that really our leaders will take that into account," Kubilius said.

The full interview with Kubilius can be watched at the for um on Friday.

The European Pulse was conducted by Cluster17 for POLITICO and beBartlet from March 13 to 21, surveying 6,698 adults online, with at least 1,000 respondents each from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Results for each country were weighted to be representative on dimensions including age, gender and geography.

“Be careful what you wish for, lest it come true,” Aesop’s fable goes.

And any American cheering alongside the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, calling for the dismantling of the EU on the grounds that it’s a bureaucratic Moloch guilty of “civilizational erasure,” should take that lesson seriously.

Setting aside the blatant contradiction between the MAGA movement’s putative veneration of national sovereignty and the high-handed manner in which the administration is dispensing advice to Europeans on how to organize their continent or whom to vote for, the anti-EU animus on full display in Washington suffers from a deeper problem.

Namely, a Europe without the EU wouldn’t be a thriving continent of “sovereign” nation-states at all.

In reality, divorced from the European project, the continent would resemble something akin to the Western Balkans following the former Yugoslavia’s disintegration: A place where all old grievances suddenly spring back to life. And that would be especially true if the EU’s imagined dissolution were to take place at the hands of the NATO movement’s supposed allies — the so-called “patriotic” forces in European politics.

After all, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s long-term political project is all about restoring “Greater Hungary” as it existed prior to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, and at the obvious expense of his country’s immediate neighbors like Romania, Ukraine or Serbia.

Then there’s the fact that bordering nationalist firebrands may have their own ideas in mind. Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić, for instance, venerates Slobodan Milošević, a dictator who launched murderous wars to keep Serbia dominant in the Balkans. Would he simply cede Subotica — or Szabadka in Hungarian — to his fellow strongman in Budapest?

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s long-term political project is all about restoring “Greater Hungary.” | Maxine Wallace/The Washington Post via Getty Images

And what about the views of those like Diana Șoșoacă, a rather colorful member of the European Parliament who wants to annex “historically Romanian” territories like Northern Bukovina from Ukraine?

The main reason why these, and many other, forms of historic revisionism are kept under a tight lid has to do with the achievements of the European project, and that includes things like free passportless travel and a high standard of rights for minorities. Take the EU away, and a whole host of previously unthinkable events become possible — from wars to “frozen” conflicts of the sort that Russia and Serbia maintain in places such Transnistria or Kosovo.

No doubt, in such an event, the bigger players would have their say too — like an already emboldened Russia that’s being egged on by the Trump administration in Ukraine and is rather keen to demonstrate the hollowness of NATO’s Article 5; or even a Germany under the possible leadership of the far-right Alternative for Germany party, which Trump ally Elon Musk urged to move beyond the country’s historic guilt.

What could go wrong, really?

The suggestion that the EU represents a dead end in Europe’s civilization betrays a profound ignorance of the continent’s history.

Since the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe has always been balancing cultural and political unity and diversity, and its succession of unwieldy quasi-federal institutions are a part of that. Far from being an aberration, the EU continues in the tradition of the Holy Roman Empire, the Hanseatic League or the Polish-Lithuanian Republic.

Of course, one may argue that what happens in Europe should be Europe’s problem, not America’s. But that’s, at most, an argument for disengagement, including a withdrawal of the U.S. security umbrella from Europe — not for the current efforts by Musk and Washington to put their finger on the scales of European politics.

Plus, the case for U.S. disengagement is weak and ahistorical. Both in 1917 and in 1941, Americans learned the hard way that while they might not be interested in a European war, a European war could very well be interested in them. In the former case, the threat to U.S. interests came from German naval attacks against U.S. vessels heading to and from Britain. In the latter, Germany declared outright war after its emboldened ally Japan struck Pearl Harbor.

America’s postwar policy toward Europe, which always included broad support for the project of regional economic integration, wasn’t a product of naiveté or the “stupidity” of previous U.S. leaders. It was guided by an effort to prevent another European war. And that policy was a stunning success, coinciding not only with an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity in Europe but also with America’s rise as the world’s uncontested global power — in part, thanks to the transatlantic relationship.

Culture wars are always thrilling, and set against the backdrop of a virulently anti-European national security strategy, the one being waged against the EU by the Trump administration is no exception. But while it’s all fun and games right now, if the EU were to crumble at the hands of Russia and Trump’s U.S., rest assured Americans would come to regret it very quickly.

Link to blog post

2026/09/17

Back in April, I came to the conclusion that Russia has decisively failed to achieve its war aims and no longer has any realistic theory for victory. By September, it seems the Kremlin has managed to find a new one.

Through 2026 every Russian offensive failed to produce results, and Ukraine has been slowly regaining the initiative on the battlefield. Even Putin appears to have accepted by now that beating Ukraine on the ground is not going to happen, and even if it did, occupying and pacifying the whole country is all but impossible.

His new strategy has two main axes.

The first is the bombing and terrorizing of Ukrainian cities, citizens, and infrastructure. One part of this is psychological warfare. He wants to push the people into exhaustion to break their will to fight. The other part is to make the Ukrainian state ungovernable and economically unviable. The hope is that the country will become sufficiently degraded, and the population sufficiently demotivated that he can eventually force them to sign a deal very favourable to Russia. Something that will make Kyiv dependent on Moscow in a quasi Georgia-like scenario.

This is the reason behind the human safaris) in Kherson, the increased bombing of Kyiv that is now happening during daytime as well, and also the attacks on passenger trains and border crossings.

The second axis focuses on Europe. The aims are similar, but the methods differ. The Kremlin’s European grand strategy concentrates on funding, supporting, and influencing far-right - and where possible far-left - parties in the hope that they would gain influence and eventually even power in member states. These parties and leaders would then align their country’s foreign and economic policy to accommodate Moscow, while breaking European unity. Putin’s dream is to get someone to do for him what Orbán did, but on a much larger scale in Germany, France, Italy, and the UK.

These forces don’t even have to be in charge to become extremely useful for Russia. Their rise alone and the threat of them gaining power is enough to stir up divisions in their countries, which forces their governments to focus inwards to counter them, and thus become incapable of a strong and confident foreign policy. Weak governments in Europe are forced to tread lightly on the issue of further Ukraine support.

This is not new. Russian influence in Europe has been steadily growing for at least two decades. What’s new are the Russian state sponsored sabotage and terror plots on EU soil, which have reached a magnitude where leaders are increasingly ready to admit them to the public. An open secret is becoming much less of a secret and finds its way to official discourse.

Will his new theory of victory fare better than the previous?

In a recent poll conducted in Ukraine, 77% of the country wants to keep resisting, even if they have to go without electricity, heat, and water for a prolonged period of time during winter. Only 12% advocates for accepting any Russian demand in exchange for peace. After the last painfully cold winter, Ukrainians society adapted, and are now planning for the same situation to repeat, and accepted it.

Terror bombings and attacks on infrastructure can make life significantly harder, but it is extremely unlikely to break the will to fight. Israel’s conducts in Gaza showcased that humans can endure immense suffering without giving up or making resistance impossible. Even without external aid.

Ukraine is not Gaza. It has the support of the world’s largest economic bloc right next door. A Union with several member states that are extremely motivated to support them indefinitely, regardless of who gets to lead their country, and no matter who governs Germany, France, the UK, or even the US.

These tactics can make Europe less united, and support more fragmented and expensive. They can cause more suffering in Ukraine and prolong the war, but history since World War II showed us that all colonial ventures eventually collapse. The reason is simple. The colonial power chooses to engage in it on foreign soil, while their victim has no choice but to fight because that is where they live, and that is where they will live.

Putin’s actions are not due to him coming up with something better, but because there is no better way of achieving his goals. After the failure of all his previous plans to subjugate Ukraine (political coercion → economic blackmail → limited invasion → full scale invasion → grinding war of attrition), this is merely his next best option.

Why continue with a hopeless strategy?

This is the problem with the Russian imperial mindset. They don’t see Ukraine as another country, but part of their own “near abroad” as they call it. Basically part of Russia, just not directly governed by Moscow. A familiar place where everyone speaks Russian and everyone lives in the same cultural reality. This is how they view Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and to some extent most of Eastern Europe.

With this logic, it is very easy to find reasons to believe why time must be on their side, victory is inevitable anyway, and eventually the West will tire itself out. After all, they must know that they have no business to do anything with the “so-called Ukraine”. They must know that it’s not “theirs”. They deeply believe that nations don’t have agency, only overlords. For them, the war is not a Russian colonial venture, but a Western one where the main power - the US - has already given up.

Putin’s thinking that far-right populist takeover in the West is inevitable got a giant boost by the election and then re-election of Donald Trump. If it can happen in the US, it’s only a matter of time that it will happen everywhere else, and he just needs to push these countries in that direction.

But Hungary could have taught him that the pendulum can swing back dramatically. A new Trump is not guaranteed to become the next US president. And Ukraine could have taught him that pushing too hard will have the opposite effect. With force, it’s much easier to create mortal enemies than obedient friends.

“Don’t poke the bear!” Russians and their Western supporters - and fearers - liked to repeat it even before the full-scale invasion. After more than four years of war and crossing every imaginary “red line” without consequences, it has become a meme at this point. The line implies that Russia is a deadly beast that has the power to lash out violently if threatened, capable of killing whoever “pokes” it.

If Russia is a bear, then Europe is a sleeping dragon. It started dozing off after 1945 and militarily and geopolitically speaking went into deep sleep after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 2022 took the dragon totally off-guard, but the dangers weren’t grave enough to make it wake up, it merely entered its REM sleep phase.

I already shared my long take about a possible Russian invasion of the Baltics, but as the topic has the habit of re- and resurfacing, I felt the urge to expand on it.

Most public debate on the topic envisions Moscow pressuring the region in order to force Europe to stop further aid to Ukraine. Despite it being understandably a more concrete and pressing threat, this - in my opinion - is much less likely than the scenario I will outline.

A limited incursion or bombing campaign against EU and NATO territories would have a much less decisive benefit for Russia, while it would still mobilize increased European support for Ukraine. The lesson the continent would learn from it wouldn’t be that Russia is strong and we should just give in, but that Russia is a threat that needs to be dealt with, and the best way to do so is by arming Ukraine and boosting defence spending.

Let’s imagine a scenario that puts Russia in the best realistic position.

US President Trump or Vance manages to cut a deal with Putin. Russia agrees to a ceasefire on the current line in exchange for US withdrawal from the Baltics and Poland, easing of sanctions, and the normalisation of relations. While this would create widespread anxieties in Eastern Europe, a renewed crisis in EU-US relationships, and further weaken NATO by decisively putting Washington’s security guarantees in question, the continent can finally breathe a sigh of relief. The war is over, Russia managed to accept that they cannot take Ukraine, and has no more reason to threaten Europe, right?

But what if Putin didn’t see it that way? What if instead of demobilizing he would rapidly reconstitute his forces from Ukraine to Belarus and Russia’s north-western borders with the Baltics? He might conclude that with NATO castrated, a friendly administration in Washington, and a Europe still in its early phase of rearmament, this is the right moment to strike and change European security architecture favourable to Moscow.

What would be his goal? The pretext might be something between the good old “protection of Russian minorities”, and the “creation of a humanitarian corridor” to Kaliningrad. His true objective would likely be to force NATO troops to fully withdraw from the region, giving the organisation a final blow, while also weakening EU unity and cohesion, creating a divided continent. This would create a reality where Russia is the de facto “security guarantor” of Eastern Europe, and use this as leverage to influence its politics. Basically, the return of the Eastern Bloc as a buffer.

Putin’s base thesis is that the “West” and its democracies are in inevitable decline. Europeans are not ready for war, and there is little to no societal resolve to defend the Baltics. Sort of “he only needs to kick the door in, and the whole system would collapse”.

How would this play out?

Let’s assume Moscow gave an ultimatum for European capitals to withdraw their forces from the Baltics while amassing its troops near the border. How would these countries react? It is possible that they might start negotiations with Russia, but it’s extremely unlikely that they would comply. The best Putin could achieve would be the status quo, and the blocking of extra troops fearing escalation. 

Then day one comes, Russian forces cross the EU border in a full-scale invasion of all three Baltic states. Putin gives another long speech watched by the entire world where he threatens to use nukes and immediate long-range strikes on Berlin, Paris, London, and anyone who is willing to engage the Russian military.

This might cause an immediate political crisis in European capitals. Perhaps many would call for an urgent troop withdrawal from the Baltics, and assuming that Russia manages to avoid killing their soldiers already stationed there, it could avoid creating an immediate rally around the flag effect. Fear might override the resolve in the vast majority of European societies. It is already a big if, but dangerously plausible enough to run with the assumption.

However, there are nations that would not be deterred, and immediately treat any kind of incursion or attack on the Baltics as an attack on themselves. This would certainly include Poland, Finland, Sweden, and crucially Ukraine. No matter what other countries do, they would do everything possible to make sure that Russia cannot reach its objectives. It would be an existential issue for them from day one.

Similarly, EU institutions would unavoidably treat it as an attack on the whole Union. Brussels cannot accept a hostile country invading any part of its territory. It would create a deadly precedent that delegitimises its entire raison d'être as a guarantor of peace.

Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Finnish, and Swedish officials occupy key positions in Brussels, and they would do everything in their power to push for a collective response. Let’s not forget that an Estonian, Kaja Kallas serves as the EU's chief diplomat. She guides the Union's common foreign and security policy and external action. She would immediately use her full political capital to make sure the EU will be mobilized to protect her country.

All in all, there would be enormous pressure from multiple directions that pushes EU institutions and member states to respond decisively.

As the days and weeks pass, it will become clear to everyone that the Baltics are not going to surrender, its population is ready to fight, and Finland, Sweden, and Poland will not back down either. Europeans would start seeing Russian bombardments and killings in EU territory. They couldn’t just ignore that nations they share decades long alliances and a common Union with are getting murdered.

These nations have not only been friendly for as long as they can remember, but essentially family. In Germany alone there are two million Poles. Many of them already have German family members, and all of them have German colleagues and acquaintances. This is true for other parts of Western Europe as well and other nations involved. 

The citizens alone would put a massive pressure on European capitals, but probably not the main one. I find it certain that Denmark, Norway, and the UK would shortly join the war as well. Geography and national identities would pull them in if NATO Article 5 wasn’t binding enough. This would create another wave of pressure on individual Europe states. As more and more countries join unilaterally, they would also start pushing everyone else for support. It would create a domino effect that couldn’t stop in Copenhagen or London.

The EU proved it time and time again that it can pull itself together to find money and political will to deal with a crisis. This was showcased clearly during the pandemic and then the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It’s impossible to imagine that Brussels would not treat this at the very least as seriously as those two instances. 

Just for the pandemic recovery fund the Union managed to come up with €750 billion, and provided $226 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance to Ukraine. €100s of billions would immediately be allocated for the war and eventually it would likely reach into the trillions mark. Russia’s roughly €165 billion military spending would immediately be put to shame.

This is where the dragon would awaken. The only reason Europe was sleeping on defence was due to its conviction that the US would protect it, and Russia would not be a threat anyway. Both of these assumptions would collapse immediately.

There would be arguments, disagreements, and not everybody would provide the same level of support. Perhaps Spain, Portugal, or Greece would not be willing to send troops (they did participate in the war in Afghanistan though, one might assume that the Baltics would be a more important cause), but they would certainly send other assistance, and would not be able to justify inaction.

History teaches us that an external attack often leads to centralization and unification. The European identity’s foundation myth is based on a story like this. The Battle of Thermopylae that united the Greeks against the Persians. More than two millennia later Bismarck showed us that a talented political operator can even provoke an external attack to create a push for unification. Europe already has the pieces scattered for this unification to happen.

Ukraine

In this situation, it would be foolish to imagine them sitting on their hands. The first place the EU would turn to would be Kyiv. They have the experience, the will to fight, and they are the only ones capable of fighting the drone war of the 21st century. Ukraine would be flooded with orders for drones and demand to train European drone pilots.

Kyiv would also eagerly take the opportunity to reopen the frontline to take back its territory. Since Russia is threatening the entire continent, now Europe would be incentivised to encourage them to do so to distract Moscow.

Eventually, Ukraine would be the real winner of this war. It would lock in European support like nothing else could, and retaking its full territories would become a likely prospect. It would clearly showcase that the continent needs them, and would give a giant boost to its EU membership aspirations.

A European Army

A European Army already enjoys popular support across the EU. All it needs is a final push.

The European Union (without Norway and the UK) has 450 million people. More than three times as many as Russia, and an economy ten times larger. Even if we are pessimistic, this would mean millions - but more likely tens of millions - of people who are ready to take up arms to defend the continent, and an economic base that can easily support them.

Perhaps the initial phases might go poorly - however knowing how the Russian army fared in Ukraine and how prepared the immediately involved countries are, this is at least doubtful -, but Europe could sustain a war much longer than Russia can, simply by the size of its economy and population.

The longer the war would go on the worse the outcome would be for Moscow. Europe would eventually organise its defence, train and equip the millions of people ready to fight, create a coherent fighting force, and learn how to wage war.

At the same time this would create an emotionally powerful story for Europe. We fight and bleed together to defend our continent and our democracies against tyranny and barbarism. This civilisational founding myth would make the EU a potential global superpower akin to the US and China. What we lack in comparison to these giants is unity. The economy and potential already exists, and a clear external threat would create that urgency for unity.

Summary

Moscow cannot just attack the Baltics and get away with it, but Putin might see it very differently. Just like Saddam Hussein didn’t learn from his disastrous war against Iran and still started another disastrous war against Kuwait in just two years, we cannot rule out Putin doing the same.

Similar incentives might be at play as well: more than one million men at arms need a purpose or they might become a domestic threat. He might think it is better to wage another war than to demobilize and face the economic and societal consequences.

Europe’s most important task for the coming years is to make sure that the Kremlin understand what would happen if they invaded. We must prepare for war so we never have to fight it. We must do everything to deter Russia regardless of what the US is doing. Moscow must hear the message clearly: don’t wake up the dragon!

2026/09/02

In the last 16 years I have become used to seeing Hungary in international news. After Orbán’s fall in April it has become a much rarer event. Something that millions of Hungarians and tens of millions of Europeans waited increasingly restlessly in the past years.

Last week however a small piece of news came out from Budapest. On Tuesday, the government published its policy guidelines where it calls Russia a treat to Europe, Hungary, and the world order, condemns its military aggression, and supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

The shift is not surprising, but what happened just a day before is more interesting. One of the Hungarian Air Force’s fully loaded Gripen fighter jet crashed during an exercise. Then on the same week a 24-year-old drunk man stole a Cessna, and began flying towards Paks, where the country’s nuclear power plant is located. The Air Force had to call up its (remaining) Gripens to go after him, who then landed on a field and attempted to steal a car.

As of today, the first incident was deemed an accident, while the second as a lone drunk person’s mischiefs (perhaps a gamer who just couldn’t wait three more months for GTA VI). It might very well be the truth, but I couldn’t help but wonder, can there be something more to it?

Strangely similar cases across Europe

On the 13th of August a munitions' factory blew up near Rome. It was producing different types of ammunitions, including artillery shells for Ukraine. The official statement claimed it was an accident.

Nine days earlier, Leipzig Airport. A drone containing explosives was discovered near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane used to transport military supplies. According to the investigation, it was supposed to blow up the aircraft, but failed to detonate. About 20 minutes after the discovery of the explosives, a second drone collided with a DHL cargo plane. Days later, a third drone was found in a field close to the airport.

Friedrich Merz’s government took its time, but finally decided to publicly blame Russia for these attacks on the 1st of September. On the same day a drone was found in Romania, drones entered Estonian airspace alerting NATO jets, and in Germany homemade rockets targeted a major power plant.

These things happening in Europe are not new, but their frequency and severity seems to suggest an ongoing escalation. Russian drones and missiles are now repeatedly flying into Romania and Poland. In Romania even an apartment building was hit not long ago. 

A list of some of the gravest recent incidents:

• April 2025, Norway: cyberattack on a dam. Norwegian intelligence attributed it to pro-Russian hackers.
• April 2025, France: cyber campaign against French public and private organisations. Paris formally attributed it to GRU (Russian Military Intelligence).
• Spring 2025, Sweden: attack on a thermal power plant. Swedish government later linked it to a pro-Russian group.
• August 2025, Poland: attempted cyberattack on a major undisclosed city's water supply. The attacker has not been publicly identified.
• September 2025, Poland: More than 20 Russian military drones entered Polish airspace.
• September 2025, Estonia: three Russian military aircraft violated Estonian airspace.
• September - October 2025, multiple European countries: large wave of mysterious drones around airports and military sites. Suspected Russian hybrid activity.
• November 2025, Poland: attempted derailment of a train with nearly 500 passengers. The Polish government claims the perpetrators worked for Russian intelligence.
• December 2025, Poland: major attack on electricity infrastructure. Warsaw attributed it to Russian-linked actors; ESET linked it to GRU.
• August 2026, Norway: major pro-Russian DDoS attack on government digital services. A pro-Russian group claimed responsibility.

These are just some of the most serious actions that are publicly known. European security services and governments likely have many more incidents that didn’t (yet) become public.

What is Russia’s strategy?

While not all similar instances are necessarily Russian sabotage, they fit perfectly into Moscow’s strategy of waging a deniable “hybrid war” against Europe to sow discord and pressure governments to stop aiding Ukraine.

In 2024, American voters gave an enormous gift to Vladimir Putin and inflicted a massive blow on European security. Donald Trump not only stopped support for Kyiv but began pressuring it to surrender to Moscow’s demands, then went on to weaken NATO’s Article 5 to the point where each passing day fewer people believe that the US is willing to step in if Russia attacked one of its members.

Europe had no other choice but to quickly took over all military and economic support. It helped Kyiv absorb and withstand every pressure from Washington, while Ukraine still managing to halt Russia’s advances on the frontline.

With US backing successfully removed and still not being able to show results, Putin have concluded that the Europeans are the only ones standing between him and victory, and once they are also neutralized, Ukraine will have no choice but to surrender.

The aim of these attacks is to knock Europe out of its supporting role. They meant to stir panic, cause fear, divide publics and create an atmosphere of vulnerability which undermines trust in governments. Trust that they are capable of protecting their country, which gives ammunition to radical parties opposing Ukrainian support.

The coming escalation

Unfortunately I suspect that these actions will continue to intensify to the point where they might lead to a mass-casualty event. Something that will be deniable, and Russia might try to blame it on Ukraine, or at least create enough confusion that no coordinated response can be politically possible. If we add the growing concerns that Putin is preparing for another mobilization, it paints a grim picture.

Despite the frontline itself being largely stalled, Moscow is not forced to conduct a new mobilization. The current scheme of paying people to sign up is still sufficient to replenish losses, while the Kremlin can still hope that Ukraine will crumble this coming winter. The country’s infrastructure is in a much worse situation than the previous year, and lacking of meaningful air defence, it is quite likely to face a dark long cold winter with lots of hardships and a potential drastic slowing of economic and production output.

Putin, so far, has been avoiding another mobilization at all cost, fearing societal backlash. And yet, it seems like this autumn he will indeed go for it, even without being forced to. Thus, there is a possibility that his goal might go further than just to replenish losses. It could be the opening of a new front somewhere in Ukraine, or perhaps to use them for a provocation in the Baltic states, or even a limited incursion.

He might conclude that this is the perfect opportunity with a friendly President in Washington, and the US being busy with the midterm elections turning inwards, with a potential added inertia if Trump ends up contesting or straight up cheating the results. All in all, he can hope for a United States unwilling to meaningfully deal with foreign policy issues, and especially not ones considering a Europe they increasingly see with contempt and hostility.

But Putin might be heading towards his most fatal miscalculation, and the beginning of his demise. Open military pressure on Europe would produce the exact opposite effect.

He seemingly locked himself into an escalation spiral he is not willing to abandon. If he faces resistance or stagnation in one place, he tends to put pressure on another where he senses weakness. He is risking an escalation that Europe can no longer afford to ignore, and might push the continent into an active war.

I made the case multiple times before that this would cause the military and the geopolitical awakening of the EU, and all but guarantee that Russia would lose the war in Ukraine.

Conclusion

One of Putin’s great weaknesses is his lack of strategic patience. He could have coerced Kyiv to stay in Moscow’s orbit if he didn’t start the war in 2014. He still had a much better shot at undermining Europe and the West if he hadn’t invaded Ukraine in 2022. The far-right was already on the rise, and very few viewed Russia as a threat.

Instead, he created an unbreakable and extremely hostile Ukraine with the largest, most advanced, and most capable military on the continent, and a Europe that is rearming on a scale that seemed unimaginable just a few years ago. No matter how the war ends, Ukrainian hostility and European rearmament cannot be reversed.

Similarly, even today, he could still try building a more advantageous geopolitical position for Russia if he decided to pause the war, normalize relations with the West, and rebuild his military while undermining European democracies, unity, and support for Ukraine. He could wait for more and more countries to be overtaken by Trump and Orbán-like figures.

After Anchorage, he proved again that he is incapable of this sort of patient long-term strategic planning. He wants it all, and wants to get it by brute force that continues on backfiring for Russia on the long term.

It remains to be seen if he will finally take a misstep that will push him towards the grave. I am not convinced that he made that decision yet, but from what I can perceive, he is thinking about it. Europeans today are not psychologically ready for war. But Putin might force them into becoming ready.

The good news

With Germany openly blaming Russia for the attempted terror attacks and European leaders showing firm solidarity, the continent has begun to prepare for this eventuality. This is a necessary first step. It demonstrates the resolve needed to deter Moscow.

But as we enter a new much more dangerous phase of the war, we still have a lot to do.

A subdued gathering in Brussels became a wake for a decades-old world order that’s slipping away.

BRUSSELS ― There’s no turning back now.

That was the message from European leaders who gathered in Brussels on Thursday.

And even though this emergency summit, called in response to Donald Trump’s threats to seize Greenland, turned into something far less dramatic because the U.S. president backed down 24 hours earlier, the quiet realization that Europe’s post-1945 rubicon had been crossed was, if anything, all the more striking for it.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the EU’s two most powerful leaders, who haven’t seen eye-to-eye of late, were united in warning that the transatlantic crisis had catapulted the bloc into a harsh new reality — one in which it must embrace independence.

“We know we have to work as an independent Europe,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told reporters at the end of the five-hour gathering.

And while, in contrast to recent EU summits, there was no tub-thumping or quarrels or even any decisions to be made, the gathering quietly signaled a tacit understanding, according to four EU diplomats and one official with knowledge of the leaders’ discussion, that there’s a fateful break between the old order and the new, the way the West has functioned since World War II and whatever lies ahead.

While the mental shift toward independence has been gestating for years ― ever since Trump first moved into the White House in 2017 ― his unprecedented threats to Greenland acted as a sudden warning, forcing them to take steps that would have been unthinkable even just a few months ago, they said.

All the officials interviewed for this article were granted anonymity to enable them to speak freely about the summit, which was held in private.

“This is the Rubicon moment,” said an EU diplomat from an eastern flank country, with knowledge of the leaders’ discussions. “It’s shock therapy. Europe cannot go back to the way it was before. They [the leaders] have been saying this for days.” What that new way would look like is — as usual — a conversation for another day.

But there have been hints at it this week. The initial response from EU leaders to the Greenland crisis — suspending an EU-U.S. trade agreement, sending troops to Greenland, threatening to deploy sweeping trade retaliation against the U.S. — served as a taste of what might come.

Everything, all at once

Between them, and then in public, leaders underscored that the speedy, unified response this month couldn’t be a one-off. Instead, it would need to define the bloc’s approach to just about everything

“It cannot be energy security or defense, it cannot be economic strength or trade dependence, it has to be everything, all at once,” one of the diplomats said.

France’s President Emmanuel Macron arrives for the summit. France is no longer an outlier in advocating for “strategic autonomy” for Europe. | Olivier Matthys/ EPA

A key feature of Europe’s newfound quest for independence is a degree of unity that has long eluded the bloc.

For countries on the bloc’s eastern flank, their location in the path of an expansionist Russia has long underpinned a quasi-religious belief in NATO ― in which a reliable U.S. had the biggest military and guaranteed the defense of all other members ― and its ability to deter Moscow. A sense of existential reliance on the U.S. has kept these countries firmly in Washington’s camp, leading to disagreements with countries further west, like France, that advocate “strategic autonomy” for Europe.

Now, France isn’t the outlier. Even countries directly exposed to Russia’s expansionism are showing willingness to get on board with the independence push.

Estonia is a case in point. The tiny Baltic country said last week it would consider deploying troops to Greenland as part of a “scoping mission” organized by NATO. Tallinn didn’t end up sending any soldiers — but the mere fact that it raised the possibility was remarkable.

“When Europe is not divided, when we stand together, and when we are clear and strong, also in our willingness to stand up for ourselves, then results will show,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said. “I think we have learned something in the last days and weeks.”

Poland, one of the staunchest U.S. backers, also stepped out of its traditional comfort zone. In discussions about how to respond, Prime Minister Donald Tusk has signaled openness to deploying the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument — a powerful trade retaliation tool that allows for limiting investments from threatening nations, according to the diplomats.

Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk speaks to the media as he arrives for the summit. Even Poland, one of the staunchers backers of the U.S., has stepped out of its comfort zone. | Olivier Matthys/EPA

“We always respected and accepted American leadership,” Tusk said. “But what we need today in our politics is trust and respect among our partners here, not domination and not coercion. It doesn’t work.”

Learning the lesson

A similar realization is taking hold in Europe’s free-trading northern countries. 

While nations like Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have historically opposed any move that risks imperiling their trading relationship with the U.S., those countries also signaled openness to retaliation against Trump.

“This is a new era where we’re not going to rely on them anymore,” said a fourth EU diplomat. “At least not for three years,” while Trump is still in office. “This [Greenland crisis] was a test. We’ve learned the lesson.”

Even Germany, whose political culture has been defined for decades by faith in the transatlantic relationship, is questioning old assumptions. Merz has hinted that Germany could be onboard with a tough trade response against the U.S.

While EU diplomats and officials credited those moves with helping to change Trump’s mind on his tariff threats, they warned that further tough choices were now in order.

“We need to own our agenda,” added the fourth diplomat. “Ukraine, productivity, competitiveness, security, strategic autonomy. The lesson is not to say no to everything.”

Tim Ross, Zoya Sheftalovich, Seb Starcevic, Victor Jack, Nette Nöstlinger, Ferdinand Knapp, Jacopo Barigazzi, Carlo Martuscelli, Ben Munster, Camille Gijs, Gerardo Fortuna, Jakob Weizman, Bartosz Brzeziński, Gabriel Gavin and Giedre Peseckyte contributed reporting.

Vladimir Putin’s goals did not change since the early weeks of 2022. He is still determined to subjugate Ukraine one way or another whatever it takes, and however long it takes. He views it as his life mission and his ultimate historical legacy as a Russian leader.

One could even argue that he will never change his ambitions. As long as he is in charge and alive - which goes hand in hand - the war will continue. But the forms it might take depends on what he is allowed to achieve. I see four main ways how the conflict will develop in the future.

The two obvious ones are the extremes: total Ukrainian military defeat and total Russian defeat. For now, these seem the most unlikely. Not that either of them are impossible, history always reserves the right to surprise everyone. An event can trigger anytime that nobody sees coming and will dramatically change the future.

A Total Ukrainian Military Defeat is Difficult to Imagine

Kyiv will always have foreign backers. As long as that is the case Ukrainian society is unlikely to lose the will and means to resist. If the country ended up under threat of being stream rolled by Russia, it is almost certain that countries that fear of being next: the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, and Poland would increase support. Most of the rest of Europe will also always see this as a critical issue. Their incentives has only strengthened in the past years as Ukraine developed technologies indispensable for European defence. The alternative would be a situation where Russia ends up controlling those technologies.

For a total Ukrainian military defeat these countries would need to be destabilized to a level of no longer being able to provide assistance, or an active military involvement from an external great power. The two countries that could theoretically make that happen would be China or the US. Even if that were to occur it’s difficult to see the rest of Europe just sitting idle.

Still, even this would not be the end of the conflict. Ukrainians would carry on resisting under occupation and in exile in any way they can. As much as Putin made this war his historical mission, Ukrainians today made it part of their identity to resist Russia. The war would evolve into a bloody occupation with guerilla warfare that could last generations, bleeding Moscow dry.

Similarly, a Total Russian Military Defeat Seems Unlikely

The potential of this outcome makes (way too) many global actors nervous. Sadly this applies to most western leaders as well. They fear the uncertainty and chaos of a disintegrating “nuclear superpower”, and they might start pushing in the other direction if this became a real possibility.

Great examples of this phenomenon were the Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever saying the quiet part out loud, or the most powerful non-state actor in the world, Elon Musk stopping Ukrainian offensives multiple times. But even Poles showed repeatedly that they are ready to start kicking Ukraine if they feel it is doing too well and might become too dominant in the region.

Still, in my opinion a total Russian defeat has a far higher chance of happening than a Ukrainian, and much more likely than how most serious military analysts believe. It takes a long time for repressive regimes to collapse in a short time. Both recent events and Russian history is full of such examples. The Assad regime vanished rapidly after a nearly 14 years long civil war that seemed like a stalemate. The Soviet Union collapsed unexpectedly at the end of the Cold War, same as the Russian Empire in the midst of World War I.

More interesting are the two more likely outcomes.

Ceasefire in the Next 1–4 Years

This is the most probable scenario. Putin would need heavy pressure or a deal good enough that Ukraine also accepts to go this way. He either needs to be convinced that continuing the war became existentially threatening to him, or that a ceasefire will put Ukraine in a position where it would be weaker than if the war continues. The latter - he hopes - could set up an easier time for Russia to take political or military control of Kyiv in the coming years.

In this case, Russia would de facto keep the territories it occupies, but it’s nearly impossible that Ukraine or the EU would legally accept it. Even other countries across the globe would be highly unlikely to do so. Very few states are interested in opening Pandora’s box of redrawing borders. Interestingly enough, in the US, territorial recognition lies solely with the President. It is not impossible that President Trump would do such a thing, which could open the door for many others to follow suit.

Either way, Ukraine would never formally or politically accept it. Its foreign and domestic politics would be hyperfocused in the coming years and decades on taking them back, similar to how French and German foreign policy were led by the sentiment of revanchism after 1871 and 1920 respectively. They would have the EU’s institutional support, and that of most European governments as well.

At the same time Russia, as long as Putin is in charge will not be content with this outcome. He wants to restore the idealized state of Moscow’s geopolitical position, the one he grew up in, and believes it is its right: Russian dominance over not only the ex Soviet Union, but all the Central-Eastern European space as well.

There is a high chance that this would merely be a pause with continuing diplomatic, economic, and covert pressures on Ukraine and Europe. In many ways, this will lead to a similar outcome as the fourth scenario.

A “Forever War”

The active hostilities might become an increasingly normalised endless conflict of varying intensity. This would be funded by Europe, fought and endured by Ukraine, and increasingly outsourced to robots and mercenaries.

Ukraine is, has been, and most likely indefinitely going to be struggling with manpower constraints against Russia. Theoretically, Moscow will always be able to mobilize more manpower. The war - and history - proved that Russian society is extremely insensitive to human losses. As long as the Kremlin thinks it can win a war by throwing meat at the problem, it will do so relentlessly.

Ukraine in contrast neither has the population nor the indifference to death and suffering. This does not mean that its society won’t be ready to absorb enormous losses to protect its independence, but it will always be a high priority to minimize losses. Therefore, Kyiv needs to develop new tactics to preserve Ukrainian lives as much as possible. Currently, there are two available methods to achieve that.

One general strategy is to gradually outsource the war to unmanned objects. Most famously aerial drones that are often operated far away from the frontline, even sometimes in home office type environments, and increasingly guided by Artificial Intelligence.

This strategy doesn’t end with aerial warfare. Underwater drones effectively beat the Russian Black Sea navy, and forced it into hiding in the port of Novorossiysk. At the same time Ukraine started deploying “robots” on the battlefields, hoping to replace human infantry with them as much as possible. In fact, they already captured enemy positions using only these unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for the first time in history.

With the technological advance in robotics, it’s only a matter of time before these systems will replace humans on the battlefield. This war will go down in history as the first conflict where they are deployed as a meaningful fighting force although for now, it remains unclear how effective they can be in the near future.

Robotics, drones, AI, these all can tap into Ukraine and Europe’s advantage over Russia. Technological development, production capacity, and capital to produce them. Russia can field more meat on the battlefield, but it is unlikely to ever be able to outproduce or outspend a militarily awakened Europe focused on high-tech warfare.

Still, today humans cannot be replaced on the battlefield. These innovations are in development with enormous potential, but in the foreseeable future Ukraine will need manpower.

Despite popular belief - amplified by Russian disinformation -, Ukraine does not have a lack of men of fighting age. The country is unlikely to run out of people. There is still enormous untapped potential. Issues with mobilization is a systematic political problem rather than a demographic one. Something that can and has to be resolved.

Still, it would be more comfortable to outsource the job as much as possible. Ukraine’s previous Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov published his plans a couple of months before his controversial removal, to fill 30-50% of assault and infantry positions with foreign mercenaries. According to Michael Kofman, arguably the best public analyst of the war in Ukraine, this goal is not entirely far-fetched.

Fedorov might have been removed from his position, but his ideas will carry on to his successor, and will continue to be a topic in the military leadership and Ukrainian society.

Conclusion

Whatever the future brings, both Ukraine and its supporters must be prepared for each scenario. And crucially, they need to signal that to Russia. Hence, robots production + mercenary recruitment on Ukrainian side, and it’s Europe’s responsibility to manifest and showcase long-term determination. Countries which treat it as an existential war must create automatic mechanisms that supports Ukraine year by year no matter what. This must be followed by a common EU mechanism, and an EU reform for an associate membership for Ukraine.

The loan passed in Brussels this year to support Ukraine is only valid for two years. This sends the message to Putin that he can outlast European resolve. And the prospect that Ukraine can remain in indefinite limbo between EU membership and isolation signals lack of determination and weakens one of Ukraine’s greatest assets, it’s societal morale.

Putin and Russia must recognise that continuing the war is futile, the determination to resist will not break, and that he has no actionable means to achieve victory on the battlefield. Until then, he is likely to escalate. Both in Europe and in Ukraine.

In Europe with increasing covert actions, sabotages, disruptions, and the escalation of his ongoing Hybrid War. In Ukraine, he will probably have to eventually pull the trigger on another wave of mobilization as a last-ditch effort. Only when that fails to produce results he might be ready for a ceasefire.

But for Russia to be ready for peace, Putin must go.Vladimir Putin’s goals did not change since the early weeks of 2022. He is still determined to subjugate Ukraine one way or another whatever it takes, and however long it takes. He views it as his life mission and his ultimate historical legacy as a Russian leader.

One could even argue that he will never change his ambitions. As long as he is in charge and alive - which goes hand in hand - the war will continue. But the forms it might take depends on what he is allowed to achieve. I see four main ways how the conflict will develop in the future.

The two obvious ones are the extremes: total Ukrainian military defeat and total Russian defeat. For now, these seem the most unlikely. Not that either of them are impossible, history always reserves the right to surprise everyone. An event can trigger anytime that nobody sees coming and will dramatically change the future.

A Total Ukrainian Military Defeat is Difficult to Imagine

Kyiv will always have foreign backers. As long as that is the case Ukrainian society is unlikely to lose the will and means to resist. If the country ended up under threat of being stream rolled by Russia, it is almost certain that countries that fear of being next: the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, and Poland would increase support. Most of the rest of Europe will also always see this as a critical issue. Their incentives has only strengthened in the past years as Ukraine developed technologies indispensable for European defence. The alternative would be a situation where Russia ends up controlling those technologies.

For a total Ukrainian military defeat these countries would need to be destabilized to a level of no longer being able to provide assistance, or an active military involvement from an external great power. The two countries that could theoretically make that happen would be China or the US. Even if that were to occur it’s difficult to see the rest of Europe just sitting idle.

Still, even this would not be the end of the conflict. Ukrainians would carry on resisting under occupation and in exile in any way they can. As much as Putin made this war his historical mission, Ukrainians today made it part of their identity to resist Russia. The war would evolve into a bloody occupation with guerilla warfare that could last generations, bleeding Moscow dry.

Similarly, a Total Russian Military Defeat Seems Unlikely

The potential of this outcome makes (way too) many global actors nervous. Sadly this applies to most western leaders as well. They fear the uncertainty and chaos of a disintegrating “nuclear superpower”, and they might start pushing in the other direction if this became a real possibility.

Great examples of this phenomenon were the Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever saying the quiet part out loud, or the most powerful non-state actor in the world, Elon Musk stopping Ukrainian offensives multiple times. But even Poles showed repeatedly that they are ready to start kicking Ukraine if they feel it is doing too well and might become too dominant in the region.

Still, in my opinion a total Russian defeat has a far higher chance of happening than a Ukrainian, and much more likely than how most serious military analysts believe. It takes a long time for repressive regimes to collapse in a short time. Both recent events and Russian history is full of such examples. The Assad regime vanished rapidly after a nearly 14 years long civil war that seemed like a stalemate. The Soviet Union collapsed unexpectedly at the end of the Cold War, same as the Russian Empire in the midst of World War I.

More interesting are the two more likely outcomes.

Ceasefire in the Next 1–4 Years

This is the most probable scenario. Putin would need heavy pressure or a deal good enough that Ukraine also accepts to go this way. He either needs to be convinced that continuing the war became existentially threatening to him, or that a ceasefire will put Ukraine in a position where it would be weaker than if the war continues. The latter - he hopes - could set up an easier time for Russia to take political or military control of Kyiv in the coming years.

In this case, Russia would de facto keep the territories it occupies, but it’s nearly impossible that Ukraine or the EU would legally accept it. Even other countries across the globe would be highly unlikely to do so. Very few states are interested in opening Pandora’s box of redrawing borders. Interestingly enough, in the US, territorial recognition lies solely with the President. It is not impossible that President Trump would do such a thing, which could open the door for many others to follow suit.

Either way, Ukraine would never formally or politically accept it. Its foreign and domestic politics would be hyperfocused in the coming years and decades on taking them back, similar to how French and German foreign policy were led by the sentiment of revanchism after 1871 and 1920 respectively. They would have the EU’s institutional support, and that of most European governments as well.

At the same time Russia, as long as Putin is in charge will not be content with this outcome. He wants to restore the idealized state of Moscow’s geopolitical position, the one he grew up in, and believes it is its right: Russian dominance over not only the ex Soviet Union, but all the Central-Eastern European space as well.

There is a high chance that this would merely be a pause with continuing diplomatic, economic, and covert pressures on Ukraine and Europe. In many ways, this will lead to a similar outcome as the fourth scenario.

A “Forever War”

The active hostilities might become an increasingly normalised endless conflict of varying intensity. This would be funded by Europe, fought and endured by Ukraine, and increasingly outsourced to robots and mercenaries.

Ukraine is, has been, and most likely indefinitely going to be struggling with manpower constraints against Russia. Theoretically, Moscow will always be able to mobilize more manpower. The war - and history - proved that Russian society is extremely insensitive to human losses. As long as the Kremlin thinks it can win a war by throwing meat at the problem, it will do so relentlessly.

Ukraine in contrast neither has the population nor the indifference to death and suffering. This does not mean that its society won’t be ready to absorb enormous losses to protect its independence, but it will always be a high priority to minimize losses. Therefore, Kyiv needs to develop new tactics to preserve Ukrainian lives as much as possible. Currently, there are two available methods to achieve that.

One general strategy is to gradually outsource the war to unmanned objects. Most famously aerial drones that are often operated far away from the frontline, even sometimes in home office type environments, and increasingly guided by Artificial Intelligence.

This strategy doesn’t end with aerial warfare. Underwater drones effectively beat the Russian Black Sea navy, and forced it into hiding in the port of Novorossiysk. At the same time Ukraine started deploying “robots” on the battlefields, hoping to replace human infantry with them as much as possible. In fact, they already captured enemy positions using only these unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for the first time in history.

With the technological advance in robotics, it’s only a matter of time before these systems will replace humans on the battlefield. This war will go down in history as the first conflict where they are deployed as a meaningful fighting force although for now, it remains unclear how effective they can be in the near future.

Robotics, drones, AI, these all can tap into Ukraine and Europe’s advantage over Russia. Technological development, production capacity, and capital to produce them. Russia can field more meat on the battlefield, but it is unlikely to ever be able to outproduce or outspend a militarily awakened Europe focused on high-tech warfare.

Still, today humans cannot be replaced on the battlefield. These innovations are in development with enormous potential, but in the foreseeable future Ukraine will need manpower.

Despite popular belief - amplified by Russian disinformation -, Ukraine does not have a lack of men of fighting age. The country is unlikely to run out of people. There is still enormous untapped potential. Issues with mobilization is a systematic political problem rather than a demographic one. Something that can and has to be resolved.

Still, it would be more comfortable to outsource the job as much as possible. Ukraine’s previous Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov published his plans a couple of months before his controversial removal, to fill 30-50% of assault and infantry positions with foreign mercenaries. According to Michael Kofman, arguably the best public analyst of the war in Ukraine, this goal is not entirely far-fetched.

Fedorov might have been removed from his position, but his ideas will carry on to his successor, and will continue to be a topic in the military leadership and Ukrainian society.

Conclusion

Whatever the future brings, both Ukraine and its supporters must be prepared for each scenario. And crucially, they need to signal that to Russia. Hence, robots production + mercenary recruitment on Ukrainian side, and it’s Europe’s responsibility to manifest and showcase long-term determination. Countries which treat it as an existential war must create automatic mechanisms that supports Ukraine year by year no matter what. This must be followed by a common EU mechanism, and an EU reform for an associate membership for Ukraine.

The loan passed in Brussels this year to support Ukraine is only valid for two years. This sends the message to Putin that he can outlast European resolve. And the prospect that Ukraine can remain in indefinite limbo between EU membership and isolation signals lack of determination and weakens one of Ukraine’s greatest assets, it’s societal morale.

Putin and Russia must recognise that continuing the war is futile, the determination to resist will not break, and that he has no actionable means to achieve victory on the battlefield. Until then, he is likely to escalate. Both in Europe and in Ukraine.

In Europe with increasing covert actions, sabotages, disruptions, and the escalation of his ongoing Hybrid War. In Ukraine, he will probably have to eventually pull the trigger on another wave of mobilization as a last-ditch effort. Only when that fails to produce results he might be ready for a ceasefire.

But for Russia to be ready for peace, Putin must go.

One of the most persistent criticisms of European federalism is the fear of an overbearing superstate: a centralised Leviathan in Brussels micromanaging education, culture, and personal lives.

In a new essay, I argue that authentic sovereignty requires a dual boundary:

1. The continent as the minimum floor of power:
   To resist external coercion, Europe needs a single military command without national vetoes, sovereign technological supply chains (space, semiconductors, energy), and continental fiscal closure. Fragmented across 27 states, we remain chronically vulnerable to foreign blackmail and tax arbitrage.

2. The continent as the maximum constitutional ceiling:
   The federation must be strictly bound by the Single Responsibility Principle. Its mandate stops at the external shell and the fiscal rails of the commons. It must never touch education, culture, or voluntary associations.

The operative principle of true subsidiarity is not: "Brussels will solve our problems for us", but rather: "through Brussels, cities and regions can solve their problems themselves."

Internally, this unlocks real individual sovereignty: zero tax on labour, collective capture of natural monopolies, and an unconditional Citizen's Dividend providing the material power to refuse economic exploitation.

Real freedom isn't about tearing down every wall; it's about knowing where to build the only wall that matters.

Full essay and architectural diagram:
https://rolfst.substack.com/p/the-dual-boundary-of-the-shell?r=1fu3&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Where do you draw the line between necessary federal competence and subsidiarity? Can this dual boundary persuade sceptics who fear centralisation?

A referendum on resuming membership talks had been expected in 2027, but could come as early as this August.

Iceland is weighing a vote on restarting EU membership talks as early as August, according to two people familiar with the country’s accession preparations.

It comes as momentum for EU enlargement appears to be growing, with Brussels working on a plan that could give Ukraine partial membership in the bloc as early as next year, and with accession front-runner Montenegro closing another negotiating chapter last month.

Reykjavík’s governing coalition had promised to hold a referendum on restarting EU accession talks by 2027, after a previous government froze negotiations in 2013. But the timeline is being sped up at a time of geopolitical upheaval and following a decision by Washington to impose tariffs on Iceland and threats by U.S. President Donald Trump to annex Greenland.

The Icelandic parliament is expected to announce the date of the ballot within the next few weeks, according to the two people who were granted anonymity to speak freely. The move comes after a flurry of visits by EU politicians to Iceland and by Icelandic politicians to Brussels. If Icelanders vote yes, they could join the EU before any other candidate country, one of the people said.

“The conversation on enlargement is shifting,” EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, who met with Iceland’s Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir last month in Brussels, told POLITICO. “It is increasingly about security, about belonging and about preserving our ability to act in a world of competing spheres of influence. This concerns all Europeans.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with Iceland’s Prime Minister Kristrún Frostadóttir in Brussels last month and said their partnership “offers stability and predictability in a volatile world.”

Von der Leyen, who visited Iceland last July, also met with Frostadóttir during a Nordic Council meeting in Stockholm last fall and praised her country for strengthening its cooperation with the EU. Von der Leyen is set to visit the Arctic region again in March.

The conversation around deepening ties with Iceland and potentially even resuming accession negotiations began even before Trump returned to office last year, with an EU official saying Brussels had already been paying more attention to the strategically important country.

But escalating threats from the U.S., among them a joke by Billy Long, Trump’s nominee for ambassador to Iceland, that the country would become the 52nd U.S. state and that he would be governor, have increased the urgency.

“I think Iceland being mentioned four times in a Trump speech [at the World Economic Forum in Davos last month while the U.S. president was talking about Greenland] has certainly focused minds,” said another EU official familiar with the situation, adding that it “must be unsettling for a small country.”

Iceland applied to join the EU in 2009 at the peak of a financial crisis in which all three of its major commercial banks collapsed. But the government froze the talks in December 2013, with Iceland’s economy rapidly recovering at the same time as economists warned of a potential eurozone collapse. In March 2015 Reykjavík asked that it no longer be considered an EU candidate country.

But the geopolitical situation has changed significantly over the past decade.

Iceland occupies a strategically important location in the North Atlantic just south of the Arctic Circle, does not have an army, and relies on its membership in NATO and a 1951 bilateral defense agreement with the U.S. for its security.

That reality, along with the economic benefits of joining the EU, seems to be warming public attitudes about potentially joining the bloc, with polling showing support on the rise.

Still, its path to EU membership isn’t straightforward.

“Accession might hit some very bumpy domestic political roadblocks down the line,” Guðni Thorlacius Jóhannesson, a former president of Iceland, told POLITICO.

The biggest potential stumbling block is over fishing rights, a key industry in Iceland and a big issue during negotiations the last time around.

“In the end it comes down to fish, that was always the issue,” the first EU official said.

But there’s one key difference between negotiations back then and now: Brexit.

The U.K. and Iceland have long had a fraught relationship over fishing, engaging in a series of violent clashes dubbed the Cod Wars between the 1950s and the 1970s. During Iceland’s accession negotiations there were serious tensions between the two countries, with the U.K. taking issue with the quantity of mackerel that Icelandic fishing vessels were catching. The dispute, dubbed the “Mackerel War,” saw the EU threaten trade sanctions on Iceland.

But with Britain now out of the EU, fishing rights could be less of a barrier.

If Icelanders do decide they wish to resume talks with the EU, negotiations could move quickly. Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area and part of the Schengen free travel area, and as such already has many of the EU’s laws on its books.

Before the freezing of talks back in 2013, Iceland had closed 11 of its negotiating chapters out of 33. Montenegro, the most advanced EU candidate country, only surpassed that milestone in the last few months.

“On paper, it would not be too difficult; it could even take just a year” to close all negotiating chapters, said the first EU official. A person familiar with the mood in Iceland, however, cautioned that such a timeline would be overly ambitious given the difficulty of some elements of the negotiations.

To actually join the EU, Iceland would also have to hold another referendum on whether to proceed after concluding talks.

Depending on how long that takes and the geopolitical situation at the time, it could be a high bar to clear, with the benefits of membership for Iceland more about security and less about economic reward. Iceland has the world’s fifth-highest GDP per capita, making EU membership less of a draw than for others that are clamoring to join the bloc.