A few days ago there was a hypothetical discussion about what measures the USSR could have taken in early 1941 to better prepare for Nazi Germany's attack. To continue that topic outside a hypothetical, what concrete means did the USSR have to mobilize its armed forces in the first 6 months of 1941? What measures were taken and what weren't?

What were the Red Army's mobilization requirements? I'll start us off with manpower, as equipment and munitions are their own can of worms.

According to the February '41 mobilization plan adopted for the Red Army (MP-41), the complete mobilization of the Red Army and navy would require the callup of 4.8 million men. Of these, some 3.5 million would be assigned to the western military districts to bring them up to full strength.

The Red Army's mobilization when Germany attacked was announced on 6/22 and began on 6/23. This was a partial mobilization and excluded several border military districts. The contingent initially called up was reservists with training born 1905-1918. By 7/1 a little fewer than 10 million men were called up from this group or 97% of the expected total.

Now, called up != deployed to one's unit, much less trained. It would take 10-14 days after mobilization began to complete the process, by which point wartime disruptions had thrown everything into confusion anyhow. But we can see that the basic task of calling up men and transporting them to their units could be accomplished within a few weeks.

Now, the head of the Red Army's Main Directorate for Manning and Staffing noted in September 1942 that:

The conscription of such a massive number of people across the entire territory of the USSR was not dictated by military-political necessity; it caused disorganization in the national economy and created unnecessary alarm among the general population.

Of the called up contingent, only 1/3 was needed to bring the western districts up to strength and 3/5 to fully mobilize the Red Army and begin creating new formations. I think it's reasonable to say that a smaller-scale mobilization would be preferable and an achievable goal.

French arms industry is famously very export oriented. After the Falkands war, did Exocet become a hot hyped thing and see an increase in demand? Or conversly, were any potential clients concerned with France cooperating and revealing specifications to their Western Allies such as Britain if things go hot?

A while back I made a post asking people here for their opinions on the Battle of Sekigahara, and I found the discussion quite interesting.

So this time I’m looking at one of the most famous victories of Oda Nobunaga, the Battle of Nagashino.

Often remembered as the battle in which firearms decisively defeated the supposedly invincible Takeda cavalry, Nagashino is easily one of the most famous battles in Japanese history, and perhaps one of the better known Japanese battles outside of Japan as well.

Now, I’ve always heard people discuss Nagashino in the context of Nobunaga’s innovative use of firearms, and the disastrous decision of Takeda Katsuyori to attack his fortified positions. But I’ve also come across arguments that the traditional story of thousands of cavalrymen charging headlong into three ranks of arquebusiers is something of an exaggeration, and that the battle was considerably more complicated than is often presented.

And that got me thinking, much like with Sekigahara, what would people with a better understanding of other periods as well as military history in general think of the battle? Particularly the decisions made by both commanders, and whether Nagashino really deserves its reputation as a revolutionary moment in military history.

The battle saw the combined armies of Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu fight against the Takeda army under Takeda Katsuyori in 1575. Traditional estimates place the Oda-Tokugawa forces at roughly 38,000 men, against around 15,000 Takeda troops.

Katsuyori had invaded Mikawa Province and laid siege to Nagashino Castle, defended by a small Tokugawa garrison of roughly 500 men under Okudaira Sadamasa. With the defenders holding out, Nobunaga and Ieyasu assembled a large relief army and advanced towards the castle. Rather than attempt to confront the Takeda in open ground, the allies established a strong defensive position at Shitaragahara, a short distance west of Nagashino. Nobunaga deployed his troops along a roughly north-south line, with wooded hills protecting one flank and the Toyokawa River towards the other. The position was further strengthened by the Rengogawa stream running across its front, muddy ground, and extensive wooden palisades constructed to obstruct the attacking Takeda troops.

Nobunaga positioned large numbers of arquebusiers behind these defences, supported by spearmen and other infantry. According to the famous traditional account, he deployed approximately 3,000 arquebusiers in three rotating ranks, allowing them to maintain a continuous volume of fire. Although the precise number of firearms and the use of organised rotating volleys remain disputed, the concentration of firearms behind prepared defensive works was nevertheless an important feature of the allied position. Meanwhile, Katsuyori advanced with the bulk of his army to confront the relief force, leaving several thousand men to maintain the siege of Nagashino Castle. His commanders, including veterans who had served under his father Takeda Shingen, reportedly disagreed over whether to risk a pitched battle against the numerically superior enemy.

The fighting began early in the morning, as the Takeda advanced against the Oda-Tokugawa positions. Katsuyori’s forces launched repeated assaults across the Shitaragahara battlefield, attempting to break through the allied defensive line. The attackers had to negotiate the stream, uneven and muddy terrain, and wooden palisades while coming under heavy arquebus fire. The traditional account describes successive waves of Takeda cavalry being annihilated by disciplined volleys, although historians have questioned whether the attacks were predominantly mounted charges, with evidence suggesting that much of the fighting involved dismounted samurai and infantry. Nevertheless, the Takeda repeatedly pressed forward, with fierce fighting developing around the defensive barriers as attackers attempted to close with the Oda and Tokugawa troops.

Despite suffering heavy casualties, the Takeda continued their assaults for several hours. Commanders such as Yamagata Masakage, Naito Masatoyo and Sanada Nobutsuna were killed during the fighting, while the Oda-Tokugawa forces largely maintained their defensive positions. The combination of concentrated missile fire, difficult terrain and prepared obstacles made it extremely difficult for the attackers to exploit any local successes. Rather than defeating the enemy in a single devastating volley, the allied army gradually wore down the Takeda through repeated failed assaults and sustained fighting along the defensive line.

Meanwhile, another important development was taking place behind the Takeda army. Nobunaga and Ieyasu had dispatched a separate force under Sakai Tadatsugu, numbering several thousand men, to move through the surrounding hills and attack the Takeda positions around Nagashino Castle. Moving under cover of darkness, Sakai’s troops launched a surprise attack against the Takeda fortifications at Tobigasuyama, threatening the besieging forces and their communications. The operation succeeded in relieving pressure on the castle and placed the Takeda in an increasingly dangerous position, with their main army engaged against a numerically superior enemy while their rear was being attacked.

As the fighting continued, the Takeda assaults lost momentum and their formations began to disintegrate. With many of his most experienced commanders dead, mounting casualties and the situation around Nagashino deteriorating, Katsuyori eventually ordered a retreat. The withdrawal turned into a disastrous defeat, with the allied forces pursuing the retreating Takeda and inflicting further losses. Baba Nobuharu was among the senior commanders killed during the retreat. By the end of the battle, the Takeda had suffered enormous casualties, traditionally estimated at around 10,000 men, although the precise figure is uncertain. The defeat cost the clan much of its experienced military leadership and severely weakened its ability to challenge Nobunaga and Ieyasu, contributing to its eventual destruction in 1582.

How do you judge the plans of the two sides? Do you think Katsuyori’s decision to attack was as foolish as it is often portrayed, or was there a reasonable tactical justification for attempting to defeat the relief army before the siege collapsed? And how much credit should Nobunaga and Ieyasu receive for their defensive preparations, choice of terrain and the flanking operation against the Takeda rear?

I’m also particularly interested in how people would compare Nagashino to battles from other periods, especially regarding the effectiveness of field fortifications and firearms against an attacking enemy. Do you think there were things either side could’ve done better? Do you think there are things worthy of praise?

With Hybrid Warfare in Europe now playing out with new technologies like drones, cryptocurrencies, and the internet among other things at their disposal, there was a time in the Cold War when domestic extremist like the Germany Red Army Faction and other militants posed a security challenge. In hindsight, how useful were gendarmerie-style forces like the Carabinieri or Internal Troops were against what they were dealing with back then? What lessons are there from the past that is relevant?

I believe there are the MiG-29K (carrier jet) and the MiG-35 (kind of a vaporware plane). I think there are some subvariants and export variants.

Meanwhile, the Su-27 got the Su-30, Su-33 (carrier jet), Su-34 (double seat strike fighter), Su-35, plus subvariants like S/SM and export variants like MKI.

What was the reason for this? As far as I know, most nations' needs are for light to medium multirole fighters. It's one reason the F-16 is so popular, and one reason the J-10CE is creeping into Russia's export markets. So you'd think the MiG-29 would have received more emphasis. But it's mainly the Su-27 family.

I was able to find platoon and company HQs, but what is in the battalion HQ and HQ company, Brigade HQ and HQ company, and Division HQ and HQ battalion, how are the organized and how do they operate?

thanks!

For example, what shows or music did soldiers fighting the war on terror know of or get to watch “Over there”? How did the tech of the time connect them to life back in the states?

So, of course Allies landed in beaches in France and all that. They also had s major operation aimed to deceive the Germans of their landing plans, with fictional US 1st Army amd other deception measures and these deception measures definitely played huge dividends

But my question is,

>1) did allies planned to deceive Germans into believing that major landing may take place in Balkans?

My interest peaked after this video.

https://www.youtube.com/live/K-tDUID24ow

He talks about a major sucessful deception operation where two spies were dropped in Balkans with instructions to reveal that landing would take place in Balkans to the German interogattors.

My question is, was the German army posted there equipped enough to fend off such invasion, if the allies decided to pursue such invasion through Balkans?

Does Germans really solidified the defence in the aftermath of the incident as described in the video, in the Balkans to stop an amphibous invasion like they did with propping up Atlantic wall , which took a huge resources from Nazi Germany in 1944?

I know Balkans is like the worse place to mount an offence with mountaineous region, so,

>did Germans understood that it's highly unlikely to have a major invasion through Balkans landing amd thus no need to have a as robust defensive preparation as was going in Atlantic wall?

As I understand, Tito had already made Balkans highly unstable and thus, did Germans considered a air landing with weapons mixed a amphibious landing and an operation to have two forces join can make a major offensive operation possible or a sane, viable, possible strategy?

After all, when Soviets actually reached Balkan borders, the offensive to oust the Germans was comparatively easy with Partisans in able leadership of Tito making Germans fly away even before Soviets actually joined the fight. So, Germans may be thinking a landing possible there?

What was the status of forces posted in Balkans, to mount an effective counter against a possible major amphibious operation? How would such an operation, if happened, would turn out?

Please be kind enough to dive deep into my questions and answer in details. I have all the time in the world to read your analysis

People like to pick on Admiral Callaghan’s orders for being confusing at the first night battle of Guadalcanal - but at least he didn’t straight up derp into a Japanese torpedo spread like Wright did, losing a heavy cruiser and 3 others damaged all for one Japanese destroyer sunk.

I know Tassaforonga is a US strategic victory because the Japanese didn’t get to resupply their garrison but the fact that Wright was immediately sent back to a desk stateside shows how badly he screwed the pooch with what the original plan was for the US force.

I’m talking about admirals that only fought a single battle as admiral in charge of the local battle.

India and Pakistan seems like a good pro example. Started thinking about it again with Iran. Thoughts? Other examples?

I how did both branch handle the poor cockpit ergonomic of the f4 phantom 2 during and post Vietnam.

And how they defer from each other.

As in the title, I am very curious to know what is the reputation of each NATO ship and navy concerning ASW.

I know that France has won several Hook'em award thanks to the FREMM but then again why not the Italien ? Don't they have the same ship ? How about the admiral ronar'c ship ? How about other navies ? Who are considered skillfull and who are considered the best endowed ?

Curious

I mean USN still has advance technologies and the idea of Perry (build more and build cheap) still applicable for modern days. So why USN failed to build an actual good frigate?

Most of the time we as a society take a slow progress in terms of making technological advances, but when it come to wars, the governments invest more resources to investigation and even different countries work together to come up with for an advantage, per example; during the ww2 the side of the alies work together to make penicilin in large mass. Again this is a great example of technological advances but at the costs of a war. ¿Is it worth create a war so we can focus on make advansments? ¿Can we justify a war by the goods or inventions during that time? Pls mind my bad English

Question from a video project I'm finishing: the Polish gap (Baltic–Carpathians, roughly 500 km wide) funnelled the major eastern campaigns — 1610, 1812, 1914, 1941 — and rasputitsa imposed the same mud calendar on everyone. In the professional literature, how much weight does terrain still get versus rail gauge, logistics and mobilisation speed in explaining why these campaigns took the shapes they did?

The explainer I made (10 min, maps): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uku3VGxQIzU — corrections from this sub especially welcome, it's the audience most likely to spot errors.

So I'm a bit curious. I know that in the European theater of WW2 most US servicemen went to places in the UK or liberated areas like Rome and Paris for shore leave/liberty/rest & relaxation. And for the most part they drank in pubs and bars, went to move theaters, hanged out with the locals, and saw the sights. But what was shore leave/liberty/rest & relaxation like for US servicemen in the Pacific War?

Because from my understanding it was a bit difficult for men to get shore leave due to the logistical constraints involved and the vast distances from the frontlines to friendly territory (Australia, New Zealand, French Polynesia, and South Pacific Islands like Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, and Vanuatu), especially as they got closer to Japan.

So with that said what was shore leave/liberty/rest & relaxation (R&R) like for US servicemen in the Pacific War? And how did it compare to the European theater of WW2?

This is a question about the Japanese Type 96 AA Gun. I am not sure this question should be posted here, but I will ask this. I still have questions about how each barrel operates in the triple barreled Type 96 AA gun, triple mount. Japanese researchers have concluded that the left and right barrels and the center barrel operate independently. However, in this video, the left barrel clearly operates independently, while the center and right barrels seem to move together. Considering that this AA gun evolved from a twin-barreled design, it would be better to add a new barrel on the right side and have the right side operate. Information about this gun is found in the United States, but I was unable to find any descriptions detailing its operation. What do you think? I'm looking for anyone who knows anything about the inner workings of this gun, including its blueprints and technical documentation.

This is the video
https://youtu.be/7XA-hd8FZ54?si=44H0SpNbtJOxzvQY&t=88

I know the definition probably varies but is there general “answer”

at first I thought it was a military unit with attached logistics but a rifle platoon with a attach support unit does not seem very self sufficient to me, so whats the actual general definition? And how self sufficient is self sufficient?

Did they have a major impact on their populations? Were there instances where they ran out of pelts, or even caused a species to go extinct?

Did they have farms for "unconventional livestock"?