From DeepSeek
The Economist Leak And The Rejected Western Offer
00:00–09:38
Alexander Mercouris begins by saying he is frustrated to return to the Ukraine diplomacy story, because he now believes the whole negotiation process is going to be “stillborn.” He notes the video’s date is given as Friday, 23 October 2026, and that the trigger for his remarks is a strategically placed leak in The Economist about the latest Western proposal supposedly carried by Steve Witkoff to Vladimir Putin.
Mercouris says the leaked plan is a variant of earlier ideas: a freeze on the existing front lines, Ukraine remaining outside NATO in some vague or indeterminate way, and a demilitarized buffer zone in the parts of Donbass still under Ukrainian control. By this point, he says, those Ukrainian-held areas are essentially limited to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. The proposal also includes Ukraine joining the European Union, an investment program, and relief from restrictions on Russian energy exports to Europe.
He stresses one detail that he finds especially strange: the gas exports would effectively be controlled through the United States, which would have some role in the pipelines. Mercouris says that would mean the Americans could turn the pipelines off whenever they chose. He calls the whole package completely unacceptable to the Russians, but also says it is not new at all.
Mercouris recalls that roughly a year earlier, before and around the Anchorage summit, a similar proposal was floated: Ukrainian-controlled Donbass, then including places like Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad and Dobropillia, would become a neutral, demilitarized buffer and free-trade zone. Putin rejected that idea outright. Mercouris also recalls that General Kellogg later proposed a land swap involving Russian withdrawals from Kharkiv and Sumy and Ukrainian withdrawals from remaining Donbass, and that Putin reportedly said this was something Russia could work with before the Anchorage meeting collapsed.
He says Witkoff apparently knew the Russians would reject the new package. At the start of the Konstantinovsky Palace meeting, Witkoff reportedly said he had new proposals, realized the Russians might not be pleased, but hoped at least to resume tripartite negotiations. Mercouris sees this as an admission that Witkoff expected rejection, and he calls it astonishing that the same rejected proposal was brought back a third time when Russia is stronger and Ukraine is weaker.
Putin's Zarubin Interview And The Closed Territorial Question
09:38–17:04
Mercouris says Putin “trashed” the proposals and metaphorically threw them into the dust bin. Then, in an interview with Pavel Zarubin, Putin closed the lid on the dust bin by making clear that the proposals were completely unacceptable. Mercouris emphasizes that Putin did not even name Witkoff during the interview, which in Russian political language and in Putin’s manner is a clear sign of annoyance and irritation.
Putin was asked about Zelensky’s remarks and about the idea of Ukraine recognizing territorial losses. Mercouris says he disagrees with the common interpretation of Zelensky’s interview and thinks people are reading too much into it; in his view, Zelensky did not clearly accept the loss of anything. But Putin’s response was blunt: these are not Ukraine’s territories, but Russia’s historical territories, and the people there voted first for independence and then for reunification with Russia.
Mercouris says Putin’s words mean that, as far as Moscow is concerned, Donbass, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson are Russian. There is no interest in buffer zones, demilitarized zones or neutral zones, because Russia does not accept that the territory is contested. He recalls that Putin’s spokesman Peskov had already said Russia would fight for every fraction of a millimeter of Donbass, and that there is no real debate in Russia about this.
Mercouris argues that anyone expecting Russia to shift on this is “whistling into the wind.” He says the territorial issue is a closed issue for Moscow. He also notes that Putin seemed irritated because, at Anchorage, he thought the Americans had shown some understanding that Ukraine must withdraw from Donbass, but a year later the discussion had returned to meaningless buffer-zone and free-trade-area ideas.
Putin then said the purpose of a new trilateral round, possibly in Abu Dhabi in mid-November, would be to discuss how the security of Ukraine and Russia can be ensured after peace agreements are reached. Putin called it a final settlement, not a temporary cessation of hostilities. Mercouris notes that Putin did not name Witkoff and instead referred only to “the representative of the US administration,” which he reads as another sign of irritation.
According to Mercouris, Putin said the American representative conceded that any future arrangement for Ukraine and Russia would require talking about the broader European security architecture. Mercouris says this is the key point: for Russia, the territorial question is closed, and the only remaining question is the general security arrangement in Europe as it affects both Russia and Ukraine.
Putin's Message To Ukraine And Europe
17:04–27:16
Mercouris says much of Putin’s Zarubin interview was addressed not to Zelensky but to the Ukrainian people. Putin repeated that Russians and Ukrainians are part of the same nation, or a people divided into two nations, and even claimed DNA tests had proved their kinship. Mercouris says he does not know what authority supports that claim, but the political message is clear.
Putin’s message, as Mercouris summarizes it, is: you know our terms. Ukraine must stay outside NATO. Donbass, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson must rejoin Russia. This is no longer a matter for discussion. Putin then asks Ukrainians why they are fighting, telling them they know they will lose, that they are suffering tragic and colossal losses, and that they are fighting their own kindred.
Mercouris says Putin then ties this to Europe. Putin argues that Ukrainians are not fighting for themselves or for Ukraine, but on behalf of certain European politicians who are obsessed with Russia and want to inflict a strategic defeat on it. Putin calls that goal clearly unachievable and asks why Ukrainians would let themselves be used in that way.
Mercouris says the unspoken words are: why not end the war now, why not get rid of Zelensky, recognize reality, accept that the war is lost, separate yourselves from the Europeans and make peace. Once peace is made, Putin suggests, Russians and Ukrainians can move forward as fraternal nations, two branches of the same tree.
Mercouris also revisits Putin’s “schizophrenia” comment about Europe. He says Putin was not simply insulting Europeans; he was arguing that there is a division between European elites, who are extremely hostile to Russia, and European peoples, who have no desire for war with Russia. Mercouris says Putin chose his words carefully because he does not want to be accused of trying to sew divisions in Europe, though he will be accused of that anyway.
Ukrainian Politics And European Negotiations
27:16–48:25
Mercouris says there have been some stirrings in Kiev about the possibility of peace. He mentions a failed attempt in the Ukrainian parliament to remove the constitutional provision requiring eventual NATO membership and replace it with a restored neutrality commitment. Zelensky’s people made sure the proposal was not taken far, and MPs who supported it were reportedly drummed out of the ruling party.
He also mentions Ukrainian publicists and commentators, including Goncharenko, who have spoken about accepting realities and making peace. Mercouris says he is deeply skeptical that such people carry much weight in Kiev today. He does believe some figures, such as former Zelensky spokesperson Julia Mendel, are sincerely seeking peace, but he does not think they represent the Ukrainian political class as a whole.
Mercouris argues that the Ukrainian political class remains committed to the struggle against Russia and has strong personal and financial incentives to keep the war going. He says he does not believe their outlook has changed. He also says Putin’s appeal to the Ukrainian army is unlikely to gain traction, because Kiev retains a tight grip on the officer corps, and officers generally retain a tight grip on soldiers.
On Europe, Mercouris says there is once again talk of appointing a single European chief negotiator to represent the EU in talks with Russia. He notes that this idea was floated a year earlier, when a major loan package was agreed, but nobody could agree who the negotiator should be. A year has passed and still nobody has been appointed.
Even if someone is appointed, Mercouris says, the mandate will likely be so restricted that the person might as well not bother going to Moscow. He notes that the Baltic states do not want negotiations at all, Nordic countries are said to be preparing for war, and Friedrich Merz in Germany gives the impression of believing he is already in a war with Russia. Other Europeans, such as the Slovaks, want deals with Russia, and Mercouris says these views cannot be reconciled.
He also says the Russians have treated previous European representatives from London, Paris and Brussels with contempt because they came making demands and delivering lectures. Mercouris sees no reason to believe a new European negotiator would be treated any differently. He concludes that the prospects for the Abu Dhabi talks leading anywhere are “all but non-existent,” and that the only likely result is worse relations between Russia and the West.
The Air War And Russian Escalation
48:25–56:25
Mercouris turns to the military situation and says Russia carried out another massive drone strike across Ukraine. The attacks again focused on Kiev’s energy system, including electricity substations north of Kiev. He says the attack appears to have been carried out with Giran-4 and Giran-5 jet-powered drones, which he describes as having qualities of small cruise missiles but being launchable in hundreds rather than scores.
He also reports a strike on power facilities in western Ukraine around Zhytomyr, with the entire region reportedly experiencing a blackout. There were more attacks on Dnipro, and the power station there has announced it is so badly damaged that it has had to stop operations indefinitely, with no prospect of early repair. In Kiev, the South Bridge remains closed after an earlier attack, and Mercouris says he has seen no footage of the damage.
Mercouris suspects Ukraine’s SBU is busy rounding up anyone trying to photograph the bridge damage and trying to stop images from appearing online. He notes there have been no satellite photos so far. He says the Ukrainians have not been inactive: they carried out another strike on Voronezh in southern Russia, possibly with three Flamingo cruise missiles, though he does not yet know what damage was done.
He also addresses claims of a catastrophic situation in Crimea. After speaking to people he knows there, he says the situation is difficult, with power outages from Ukrainian drone attacks, but not catastrophic. He stresses that whatever damage Ukraine does to Voronezh or Crimea cannot compare with the vastly greater damage Russia is inflicting on Ukraine every day.
Mercouris recalls Putin saying in July 2022 that Russia had not even started yet. He says Russia may now have started, but the peak of attacks and strikes is still far off. He expects more missile types, more drones, and more large-scale bombing of cities and bridges. He says attacks on bridges so far have been more harassment than destruction, and the big attacks on bridges are still to come.
The Ground War In Zaporizhzhia And Donbass
56:25–01:19:52
Mercouris says there have been significant developments around Zaporizhzhia city and its southern outskirts. General Gerasimov surprised many by claiming Russia had captured Malokaterynivka north of the Kakhovka reservoir and south of Zaporizhzhia city, and that Russian forces were within five kilometers of the city. Mercouris says many people thought Gerasimov was making it up, but there are now many Russian reports of Russian troops on that territory.
Russian sources claim capture of Malokaterynivka and another village to the east, Ulifka. Other reports claim full capture of Prymorske and Plavni on the east bank of the Dnieper. Ukrainian video footage reportedly shows Russian soldiers in the center of Stepnohirsk, confirming Russian claims to have recaptured that town. Mercouris says many people now say Russia has reversed all the temporary gains of Ukraine’s extremely costly 2023 counteroffensive in western Zaporizhzhia.
He cautions that there is still little fully convincing video footage to confirm everything. A photograph is circulating of a man said to be a Russian soldier on an outskirts of Zaporizhzhia city north of Malokaterynivka, but Mercouris says he cannot draw conclusions from it. He thinks it is possible some of these are Russian reconnaissance troops infiltrating rather than infantry fully consolidating positions.
Against that, he notes that Russian Defense Minister Belousov congratulated Russian paratroopers on capturing Ulifka, which suggests more than infiltrators and sabotage groups, and that Ulifka at least is under firm Russian control for now. Mercouris then discusses a Russian newspaper analysis of Ukraine’s dilemma at Orikhiv: if Ukraine abandons Orikhiv and positions further south, its southern Zaporizhzhia positions could crumble; if it keeps forces there, it drains reserves and weakens defenses around Zaporizhzhia city itself.
Mercouris wonders whether Russia deliberately kept the battle of Orikhiv going to draw Ukrainian troops there, leaving insufficient troops guarding Zaporizhzhia city and facilitating Russian infiltration in the same way Russia infiltrated Bakhmut, Myrnohrad and Kostiantynivka. If so, he says, it was a major Ukrainian strategic error, but also part of the many mistakes Ukraine has made in this war.
In eastern Zaporizhzhia, Mercouris cites Readovka analysis saying Russian forces are close to encircling Ukrainian troops along the Vovcha Tersa River in two places, especially near the village of Orilnyk, which Russia claims to have captured. If true, he says the situation of Ukrainian defenders in eastern Zaporizhzhia is turning catastrophic. He again cautions that confirmed footage is limited.
Mercouris then reports that Ukrainian authorities have ordered a mandatory civilian evacuation of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. He is unsure whether it covers the entire civilian population or only parents and children, but says an evacuation order of some kind has been issued. He notes that Slavyansk was the area Operation Vivaldi was supposed to secure, and asks how one explains the evacuation order if that operation was a success.
He suspects the order reflects that after Operation Vivaldi ended and Azov forces withdrew from northern Donbass, Russia is back on the offensive. Readovka reportedly says Russia is returning to Lyman with the intention of clearing it, and Russia appears in secure control of Rai-Oleksandrivka and may soon return to Nikolske and the Slavyansk thermal power plant. Mercouris also suspects the fall of Dobropillia and the threat of encirclement around Belos? threaten westward escape and supply roads.
Mercouris says the evacuation order highlights that the situation is deteriorating in Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. He also says Ukrainian forces are continuing to concentrate reserves to hold those two cities, and he suspects Russian generals are saying that Ukraine is sending more men into the bag, into the cauldron forming in Donbass.
He then discusses a Daily Telegraph article by David Blair, a former British diplomat with whom Mercouris disagrees on almost everything but whom he considers insightful. Blair argued that the fortified towns in Donbass are Ukraine’s key defense line, and that if they fall or if Trump forces Ukraine to give them up, Kiev itself becomes vulnerable. Mercouris agrees, saying he has been saying this since the start of the special military operation.
But Mercouris notes that Blair still spoke of Kostiantynivka as under Ukrainian control, when in reality Russia has controlled it since July and has pushed far beyond it, taking Dobropillia and apparently Oleksandrivka north of Kostiantynivka, with fighting also around Duska? Mercouris says this is an example of what happens when one accepts information from only one source, in this case Ukraine and its Western echo chambers.
Kharkiv, The Azov Withdrawal And Possible Collapse
01:19:52–01:19:52
Mercouris says further north there appears to be a disaster developing in Kharkiv region that in some ways parallels what is happening in Zaporizhzhia. Russian forces appear to be advancing toward Velykyi Burluk from the north, while Group of Forces West is also advancing northwards toward Velykyi Burluk from around Kupyansk. That suggests Velykyi Burluk may be attacked from two directions and encircled.
He says Russian forces advancing west from Kupyansk have apparently used underground pipes again to get behind Ukrainian defenses. This is becoming a recurring theme in the war. Mercouris says he is not exactly clear where Russian forces are, but with Group of Forces North advancing toward Velykyi Burluk and Group of Forces West pushing west after Operation Vivaldi ended, the objective may be Izium and the nearby town of Balakliya.
Mercouris says that with the Azov brigade having vacated this territory, a collapse may soon be seen here as well. He notes that Readovka speculated that Azov forces withdrawn from the Lyman area would be redeployed to the Dobropillia area, and that Biletsky himself might come to take control there, but so far there has been no sign of him or them.
He then connects this to Putin’s sarcastic comment about nationalist brigades not liking to stay on the front lines for long. Mercouris wonders whether Biletsky is pulling his 3rd Azov Corps away from the front because he can see the developing crisis in Donbass, and whether that is what provoked Putin’s comment. This would mean positions north of Slavyansk and in the Lyman area have suddenly been weakened.
Mercouris says this begs the question of where Biletsky and the 3rd Azov Corps are going. He recalls American commentator Gordon Hahn saying early in Operation Vivaldi that Biletsky’s primary focus was going to be Kiev, that he would not stay in the woods and marshes around Lyman for long, and that he would redeploy forces to Kiev where his political ambitions lie. Mercouris wonders whether that is now taking place.
The Middle East And Final Warning
01:23:42–01:24:13
Before ending, Mercouris says he must refer to the rapidly deteriorating mood in the Middle East. There are reports that Iran’s IRGC is undergoing missile exercises. He recalls recent reports of US embassy personnel withdrawals and reports that the British government is deploying Typhoon fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, supposedly to take on the Houthis, though those jets could also be used against Iran if London gave the order.
Mercouris says there is growing anxiety, and oil prices have suddenly leaped upward, apparently heading toward $120 a barrel. The messaging over recent weeks had been that President Trump intended to launch a big strike against Iran after the midterms. But the chatter now is that the strike could be launched at any moment and is in advanced stages of preparation.
He says Iran has made clear it will respond against targets across the Middle East, especially if its infrastructure or civilian infrastructure is attacked, which presumably includes energy facilities. Mercouris says he cannot think of worse timing for such a war or restart of a war than before winter, when energy prices are already elevated.
He ends by saying his guess up to yesterday would have been that the strike would take place after the midterms. Today, he says frankly, he is no longer so sure. He then closes the program with his usual reminders about platforms, support and subscribing.
